13.1.1.1
This section of the EIA presents the analysis and
findings of the Hazard to Life Assessment undertaken for the Project.
13.1.1.2
In accordance with Section 3.4.14 of the EIA
Study Brief (ESB-360/2023), a hazard to life assessment should be conducted to
evaluate the risks from dangerous goods (DG) due to the existing and/or planned
hazardous facilities, including but not limited to the planned desalination
plant at TKO 137, town gas pipeline, synthetic natural gas production plant,
LPG filling stations, explosive off-loading pier, and potential biogas
production and storage at the proposed effluent polishing plant, during both
construction and operation phases of the Project.
13.1.1.3
In addition, a review of the risks from the use,
transport and overnight storage of explosives (if any) during construction and
operation of the Project should be conducted,
and assess if risk to life is a key issue with respect to Risk
Guidelines given in Annex 4 of the TM.
QRA for the use, transport and overnight storage of explosives for the
Project shall be conducted if, and only if, risk to life is a key issue with
respect to Risk Guidelines following the requirements in Section 12.1 of the
TM.
13.1.1.4
The
locations of hazardous facilities that were assessed with respect to the
Project Site are shown in Plate 13‑1. Furthermore, it is confirmed that all the proposed facilities
in TKO 132 have been reviewed and no risks from dangerous goods due to existing
and/ or planned hazardous facilities in TKO 132 are identified.
Plate 13‑1 Locations of Hazardous Facilities and Project
Layout
13.2.1.1
As set out in Annex 4 of the EIAO-TM, the
criterion for hazard to life specifies
the Individual and Societal Risk Guidelines. The Hong Kong Government Risk
Guidelines (HKRG) per the EIAO TM Annex 4 states that the individual risk is
the predicted increase in the chance of fatality per year to an individual due
to a potential hazard. The individual risk guidelines require that the maximum
level of off-site individual risk should not exceed 1 in 100,000 per year i.e.
1×10-5 per year. Societal risk expresses the risks to the whole
population. It is expressed in terms of lines plotting the cumulative frequency
(F) of N or more deaths in the population from incidents at the installation.
Two F-N risk lines are used in the HKRG that demark “Acceptable” or
“Unacceptable” societal risks. To avoid major disasters, there is a vertical
cut-off line at the 1,000 fatality level extending down to a frequency of 1 in
a billion years. The intermediate region indicates the acceptability of
societal risk is borderline and should be reduced to a level which is “as low
as reasonably practicable” (ALARP). It seeks to ensure that all practicable and
cost-effective measures that can reduce risk are considered. The HKRG is
presented graphically in Plate 13‑2.
Plate 13‑2 Societal Risk Guidelines
13.3.1.1
The Hazard to Life Assessment requirements for
the hazardous facilities and explosives as detailed in Appendix L of the EIA
Study Brief are shown below:
(a)
Identify hazardous scenarios and then determine a
set of relevant scenarios to be included in a Quantitative Risk Assessment
(QRA);
i.
For hazardous facilities: Hazard scenarios
associated with the manufacture, on-site transport, storage and use of
dangerous goods in the hazardous facilities;
ii.
For Explosives: Hazardous scenarios associated with
the use, transport and overnight storage of the explosives.
(b)
Execute a QRA of the set of hazardous scenarios
determined in (a), expressing population risks in both individual and societal
terms;
(c)
Compare individual and societal risks with the
criteria for evaluating hazard to life as stipulated in Annex 4 of the TM; and
(d)
Identify and assess practicable and cost-effective
risk mitigation measures to demonstrate the compliance
with the Risk Guidelines.
13.3.1.2
This assessment consists of the following six
main tasks:
(a)
Data / Information Collection and Update: collect relevant data / information that is
essential for the hazard assessment;
(b)
Hazard Identification: identify credible set of hazardous
scenarios associated with the operation of the hazardous facilities /
explosives;
(c)
Frequency Estimation: estimate the frequencies of the identified
hazardous scenarios by using Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis;
(d)
Consequence Analysis: analyse the consequences of the identified
hazardous scenarios by using the well-established and widely accepted model,
e.g. SAFETI, ESTC;
(e)
Risk Assessment and Evaluation: evaluate the risks associated with the
identified hazardous scenarios. The evaluated risks will be compared with HKRG
to determine their acceptability. Where necessary, risk mitigation measures
will be identified and assessed to comply with the ALARP principle used in the
HKRG; and
(f)
Identification of Mitigation Measures: review the recommended risk mitigation
measures from previous studies, practicable and cost-effective risk mitigation
measures will be identified and assessed as necessary. The risk outcomes of the
mitigated case will then be reassessed to determine the level of risk
reduction.
13.3.1.3
According to the latest design, it is confirmed
that the use, transport and overnight storage of explosives is not required for
the Project, therefore, risk assessment associated with explosives related
issue is not required.
13.3.1.4
In
consultation with the Hong Kong and China Gas Company Limited, medium pressure
town gas pipeline will be enough for both TKO 132 and 137 development, no high
pressure town gas pipeline is anticipated and thus risk assessment associated
with town gas pipeline is considered to be not necessary.
13.3.1.5
With reference to Section 5 of Appendix L of the
EIA Study Brief, the methodology adopted in the risk assessment associated with
planned desalination plant at TKO 137 is consistent with previous studies
having similar issues (e.g. EIA
study of the Desalination Plant at Tseung Kwan O (EIA Register No.
AEIAR-192/2015) and Detailed Design Plan for Chlorine and Carbon Dioxide
Storage of Desalination Plant).
13.4.1.1
The risk results for the planned desalination
plant associated with chlorine, sulphur dioxide and liquid carbon dioxide
hazards are detailed in Appendix 13.1. The maximum individual risk (IR) is found to
be 1×10-7 per year, which is confined within the boundary of the
desalination plant. Given the off-site individual risk does not exceed 1×10-5
per year, the level of individual risk posed by the operation of the facility
to the surrounding population is considered acceptable and in compliance with
the HKRG. In addition, the societal risks fall within the “Acceptable” region
in both assessment years,
while the potential loss of life (PLL) for the facility were found to be about
2.5×10-6 and 2.0×10-6 per year for year 2035 and 2041
respectively.
13.5.1.1
The risk results for the existing SNG production
plant are detailed in Appendix
13.2. The 1×10-5 per year contour is
confined within the boundary of the SNG production plant. Given that there is
no off-site risk with frequency greater than 1×10-5 per year, the
level of individual risk posed by the operation of the facility to the
surrounding population is considered acceptable and in compliance with the
HKRG. In addition, the
societal risks fall within the “Acceptable” region in both assessment years,
while the potential loss of life (PLL) for the facility were found to be about
2.6×10-8 per year and 2.3×10-8 per year for year 2030 and
2041 respectively.
13.6.1
Background
13.6.1.1
The
explosives off-loading pier (pier) is located on the southeast corner of TKO
137, it is currently operated by Mines Division of Civil Engineering and
Development Department (CEDD). The Pier is used for the explosives delivery
operation from the Government Explosives Depot at Kau Shat Wan, Lantau, to
projects throughout the HKSAR. The pier
will be relocated before the first population intake at the northern part of
TKO 137 in 2030, and there will be no manufacture,
storage or use of dangerous goods in the explosives off-loading pier
accordingly.
13.6.1.2
According
to the latest available information from CEDD, the pier may be retained
supplying explosives to support the developments within the area under other
projects, till end of 2029. The pier
will be decommissioned and relocated thereafter.
13.6.2
Evaluation of Risk Implications
Associated with Operation of Explosives Off-loading Pier
13.6.2.1
The
development of the Project is divided into several phases. Details of the site phasing plan please refer
to Appendix 2.3 of Section 2. The construction activities of the Project
will be commenced in phases, starting from Phase A at the northern portion of
the development site in Q4 2025, to Phase J at the southern portion of the development
site in Q4 2031.
13.6.2.2
Under the EIA study of the Desalination Plant at
Tseung Kwan O (EIA Register No. AEIAR-192/2015), a QRA was carried out to
investigate the feasibility of coexistence of the pier and the proposed
desalination plant. The Environment Review Report (ERR)
carried out in 2017 for the Desalination Plant shows the individual risk
contour plot associated with the pier down to 1E-06 per year, it also stated
that the hazard distance of 1% fatality probability for the explosives
unloading operation is 161m. According
to Figure 11.18 of the ERR, the individual risk contour 1E-06 per year will not
encroach into the boundary of this Project.
13.6.2.3
Further,
the development sites of the Project closest to the pier will be developed in
Phase J, in which any construction activities will be commenced no earlier
than December 2031 and the earliest population intake of this phase is 2035.
There will be no construction activities within the 1% fatality
probability for the explosives unloading operation (i.e. 161m from the pier) before the
decommissioning and relocation of the pier, operation of the pier will have no
risk implication on the Project during both construction and operation phases.
Plate 13‑3 Individual
Risk Contours of the Pier
13.6.3
Evaluation of Risk Implications
Associated with Off-site Transport of Explosives from Explosives Off-loading
Pier
13.6.3.1
According
to CEDD, the approximate weight of the explosives to be transported is 800kg,
to support the developments within the area under other projects till end of
2029. The consequences of
accidental explosion during transporting explosives from the pier is assessed
by the Explosives Storage and Transport
Committee (ESTC) model developed by the UK Health and Safety Committee
(HSC)
to determine the probability of fatality due to blast and overpressure
waves. The hazard zone of 1% fatality probability
associated with transportation of 800kg explosives is 87m for indoor population
and 31m for outdoor population. A buffer distance of 90m along the transport
route of explosives will be kept for all site offices of the Project. For the outdoor construction activities, the
contractors will keep close liaison with CEDD on the schedule and routing of
explosives delivery, all construction activities within a 35m buffer distance
along the transport route of explosives will be suspended during the explosives
delivery and all construction workers will also be evacuated from the zone.
13.7.1.1
A Green Fuel Station (GFS) with provision of LPG
filling facilities is proposed at the southern portion of the development,
close to the existing pier. The risk
results for the proposed GFS are detailed in Appendix
13.4. The maximum individual
risk of less than 1×10-5 per year was observed. Given that there is
no off-site risk with frequency greater than 1×10-5 per year, the
level of individual risk posed by the operation of the GFS to the surrounding
population is considered acceptable and in compliance with the HKRG. In
addition, the societal risks fall within the “Acceptable” region in both
assessment years, while the
potential loss of life (PLL) for the facility were found to be about 8.6×10-6
and 8.2×10-6 per year for year 2035 and 2041 respectively.
13.8.1.1
The risk results for the proposed effluent
polishing plant are detailed in Appendix
13.3. A salient finding from the
individual risk result is that the maximum individual risk is less than 1×10-5
per year and highly localized around the biogas equipment and largely confined
within the site area. The 1×10-6 per
year individual risk contour only exceeds slightly outside the proposed
EPP. Furthermore, even the lowest risk
contour of 1×10-9 per year does not reach any residential area
nearby. As such, it is concluded that the proposed development and associated
activities do not impose any significant risk to the nearby population and
conform with HKRG.
13.9.1.1
This section addresses secondary impact and
cumulative impacts of the Project related to the planned desalination plant,
existing SNG Production Plant, proposed effluent polishing plant and proposed
GFS.
Secondary Impact
13.9.1.2
Secondary impact refers to indirect or induced hazardous
event in which another hazardous source is initialized by a hazardous event of
an initiating hazardous source. In general, toxic effect does not cause
knock-on impact to other hazardous sources. The maximum hazard distance from
the planned EPP is about 77m and is confined within the EPP boundary and thus,
will not affect the Desalination Plant. Meanwhile, the separation distance
between road tanker in the planned GFS and chemical building in DP is about 85
m, which is greater than the fireball radius of about 60 m due to catastrophic
failure of a 9-tonnes LPG road tanker and thus, knock on effect due to the
planned GFS is also not anticipated. A review of the secondary impact to other
hazardous sources is summarised in Table 13.1.
Table 13.1 Summary
of Secondary Impacts
Target
Source
|
Chlorine
|
Hydrogen
|
Sodium Hypochlorite
|
Sodium Bisulphite
|
32% wt HCl
|
Liquid Carbon Dioxide
|
Other DGs
|
SNG Power Generation
|
Proposed Green Fuel
Station
|
Proposed Effluent
Polishing Plant
|
Chlorine
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
Hydrogen
|
May result in indoor chlorine release but no offsite impact [Note
4]
|
|
Separate compartment and provided bund containment in case of spillage
|
Separate compartment and provided bund containment in case of spillage
|
Separate compartment and provided bund containment in case of spillage
|
20 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
310 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
50 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
Sodium Hypochlorite
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
Sodium Bisulphite
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
32% wt HCl
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
Liquid Carbon Dioxide
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
Other DGs
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
SNG Power Generation
|
50 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
50 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
50 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
50 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
50 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
80 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
370 m separation; no impact [Note 3]
|
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
Proposed Green Fuel
Station
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
No impact
|
Proposed Effluent
Polishing Plant
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
No impact
|
|
Note 1: The separation distance is greater than the required separation
distance 178m for the explosives unloading pier.
Note 2: No hazard to life issue by considering chemicals’ concentrations
in the atmosphere due to accidental spillage and the escape factor of the
surrounding population.
Note 3: The separation distance is greater than the maximum hazard
distance 47 m for SNG Power Generation and 11m for hydrogen (OSCG).
Note 4: Chlorine gas pipeline close to the explosion source may be
damaged. Chlorine generation will be disrupted in the explosion.